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Abstract—Cloud computing dramatically reduces the expense 
and complexity of managing IT systems. Business customers do 
not need to invest in their own costly IT infrastructure, but can 
delegate and deploy their services effectively to cloud vendors 
and service providers. A number of security and protection 
mechanisms have been proposed to prevent the disclosure of 
sensitive information or tempering with the data by employing 
various policy, encryption, and monitoring approaches. However, 
few efforts have been focused on data mobility issues in terms of 
protection of data when it is moved within a cloud or to and from 
a new cloud environment. To allay users’ concern of data control, 
data ownership, security and privacy, we propose a novel data 
mobility management model which ensures continuity protecting 
data at new cloud hosts at new data locations. The model 
provides a mobility service to handle data moving operation that 
relies on a new location database service. The new model allows 
the establishment of a proxy supervisor in the new environment 
and the ability of the active data to record its own location. The 
experimental outcomes demonstrate the feasibility, proactivity, 
and efficiency by the full mobility management model. 
Keywords—data mobility, data protection, cloud mobility, data 
location 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing has been gaining acceptance across 
various domains ranging from business to research [1]. In order 
to make effectively use of cloud services, users’ data is stored 
in a cloud where applications are able to perform more cost-
effectively requests from clients. Two major concerns arise 
naturally: first, users are concerned that they lose the control of 
their data once it is transferred to the cloud, and second, cloud 
service providers are concerned that they may not be able to 
protect the data effectively when it is moved about both within 
and out of its own cloud environment. Despite the fact that 
cloud service providers have provided security mechanisms to 
deal with this issue by employing various policy and 
encryption approaches. While data is particularly protected at 
its home cloud, it still exposes to potential disclosure and 
attacks if located at another cloud where there is no 
equivalence security measure at different sites from different 
CSPs [2]. Consequently, these data mobility issues have to be 
addressed in any data security models for cloud. Despite of the 
issues associated with interoperability and exchange 
information issues among cloud, user’s data should still be 
protected at new cloud environments with compatible or 
equivalent measures it enjoys in its home environment. 
In a realistic cloud scenario with complex and dynamic 
hierarchical service chain, the handling of data in a cloud can 
be delegated to another. However, CSPs do not often deploy 
the same protection schemes [2]. In addition, when user’s data 
is moved to data centers located at locations different from its 
home, it ought to register with a supporting service to report its 
locations to the original cloud and its data owner. This may be 
achieved if these CSPs have agreed on a Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) that enables establishing a required 
monitoring service from the original cloud. When a violation 
against the established SLA occurs, the monitoring component 
will be able to detect it through the corresponding CSP and 
trigger protection services on the original cloud which can 
immediately analyse and audit the data. Moreover, data 
locations need to be maintained at the original cloud and 
encoded within the data itself in case it loses the connection 
with its monitoring service. Under such circumstances, the 
location data can be used subsequently to trace previous 
locations and data operations or trigger original mobility 
services if data is moved back to a Cloud. For the users, they 
are concerned whether their data is located in locations covered 
by the SLA and data operations are protected from 
unauthorised users. Mechanisms should be available to report 
information concerning the data, such as the data location, 
access, or violation, to their owner if and when necessary. 
This paper addresses the above concerns from a novel 
perspective, offering a data mobility management model with 
enhanced transparency and security. In this model, we extend 
our active data framework with an appropriate data structure 
and a Location Registration Database (LRD) to deal with 
mobility; we investigate protocols between clouds for data 
movement; we investigate procedures for establishing a clone 
supervisor at a visited cloud for monitoring purposes. The 
proposed data mobility model focuses on two aspects: data 
mobility management (DMM) and active protection service. 
The DMM deals with physical location changes of user’s data 
in various cloud environments, and ensures these locations be 
recorded at LRD as well as within the data itself and whether 
the new physical location conforms to the pre-established 
 SLA. The active protection service deals with extending data 
protection when the data is moved to various locations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses related work on data mobility in cloud. Section III 
reviews briefly our Trusted-Oriented Data Protection 
Framework proposed in an earlier work. Section IV defines 
components and parties involving in the mobility model and 
introduces data moving cases. Section V presents the design of 
the proposed data mobility management model. Section VI 
presents an implementation for the model. Section VII present 
the evaluation and analysis of the proposed model. The 
conclusion and future work will be drawn in the section VIII. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Ries et al. [3] focused on verifying geographic data location 
in a cloud environment, detecting data movements and proving 
data possession for data moving among CSPs. However, these 
efforts mainly relied on network latency and distance between 
Clouds and focused little on data protection and relationship 
between data and users.  
Chen and Hoang [4] proposed an active data binding 
framework in addressing data mobility and user mobility. This 
research concentrated on notifying data owners when their data 
is moved from one location to another, tracking data 
geographic location using Google services and integrating 
active data-centric framework to collect evidences of data 
movement. However, the lack of secured components or 
equivalence protection schemes at the new location results in 
data violation and illegal disclosure as there in no monitoring 
services to track the data and prevent illegal requests. 
Consequently, data cannot be independently survived in the 
heterogeneous cloud environment. 
Popa [5] proposed a data traceability service for mobile 
computing application. A security framework for this service 
includes security components which ensure integrity, 
authenticity, confidentiality and non-repudiation and 
management components which apply the appropriate security 
components to user’s private data. Users can create a request to 
read, modify or even transfer the data via mobile applications. 
When a request is performed, a message from a trace service 
will notify the user that his private data was accessed. This 
approach only considers the case that the data is accessed by 
data owner. There is no data movement from one Cloud to 
another. A request to send data is simply performed by creating 
a copy of the data. The data sent by user will not be traced by 
the service. 
Betge-Brezetz [6] proposed a privacy control model at the 
Virtual Machines (VM) level to protect sensitive files stored, 
processed, and moved in an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
cloud. The demonstration involved clouds located in different 
countries and but run on the same platform. The model requires 
cloud service providers to build the same cloud platform and 
establish the same privacy control modules in order to protect 
the data moving among clouds. Overhead is an issue at this 
VM control level. 
Nikolay Tcholtchev [7] introduced the concept of mobility 
data cloud in which a cloud is utilized as a platform for the 
providers. The work also proposed a framework for the 
acquisition, aggregation, provisioning, and analysis of mobility 
relevant data originating from various sources. 
All the above approaches have not addressed the security 
requirements to protect data from violation attacks when data is 
located at visited cloud sites. The data mobility management 
model in this paper leverages our active data protection 
framework [8] in developing protocols for moving data among 
clouds and in establishing a new supervisor at a visited cloud 
for monitoring data and data operations at the new cloud as 
well as reporting the welfare of the data to the original cloud. 
In addition, active data will be designed with recordable 
structure enabling data to store various locations when data is 
accessed. The model enables data to be moved among clouds 
of different infrastructures ranging from private cloud to public 
cloud while ensuring data protection regardless of its location. 
III. TRUST-ORIENTED DATA PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
In an earlier work, we proposed a Trust-Oriented Data 
Protection Framework for data protection in Cloud 
environments [8]. 
Fig. 1. Trust-oriented data protection solution in cloud 
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed trust-oriented cloud data 
protection framework. The framework is structured into 3 
blocks: the data security control block provides secure access 
control and data auditability functions, the data core protection 
block provides techniques and procedures for implementing 
active data protection, and the data operation and management 
block handles mobility and data replication management. This 
framework can be considered as a secure data container that 
manipulates, and verifies the data within without the 
involvement of a third party service. This structure presents a 
security and trust abstraction at a higher level than 
conventional data protection models that rely on the peripheral 
security environment and third party protection mechanisms. 
Our core goal is to empower data the capabilities of self-
defend and self-protect against intrusions or violations. Data 
misbehaviour and violation can be actively detected by the 
data itself, reducing the risk of use by adversaries. The data 
core protection block employs an active security approach 
whereby the data is made active against any invocation, 
 whereas the data security control block and data operation and 
management block support this active approach by providing 
data auditing and other measures including secure access 
control, data replication and mobility. 
 
A unit of raw data is transformed into a novel data 
structure called a Triggerable Data File Structure (TDFS). The 
TDFS consists of a shell and a core as shown in Figure 2. The 
shell is equipped with active tamper-proofing codes and is 
executed prior to the core when the TDFS is triggered. A 
TDFS is also referred to as an Active Data Cube (ADCu). The 
core of the TDFS comprises an executable segment, a header, 
and data blocks. The runnable scripts in the executable 
segment allow basic data operations, data loading, and data 
analysis functions. The header refers to a manifest specifying 
the basic information related to the data such as security 
header, data descriptor, and timestamp. Raw data blocks are 
encrypted. 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of an Active Data Cube 
As the ADCu can only protect and manage the contents 
within, it cannot be triggered if adversaries attempt to execute 
operations such as move or delete the whole data cube. The 
supervisor thus is designed to monitor operational system 
(OS) level data manipulations that cannot be detected by the 
ADCu itself. An atomic data security model, called the Active 
Data Protection unit (ADPu), is needed for supporting the 
active protection functions of the ADCu within the protection 
framework. The APDu is an atomic component combining 
two entities: a supervisor and an ADCu.  
The management and coordination of Cloud data for each 
tenant is processed by the supervisor, an active service 
instance that is activated when the corresponding tenant 
subscribes to cloud storage services.  
In this framework, two services are proposed for data security 
control: the Cloud Privacy-aware Role Based Access Control 
(CPRBAC) service and the Active Auditing Control (AAC) 
service. The CPRBAC service defines and describes the 
security boundary on data operations in cloud. Resource 
requests that are not allowed in the policy repository will be 
rejected. The AAC is introduced to execute and audit users’ 
requests in a secure and consistent manner. Users’ requests 
must be actively audited under a distributed transaction 
management session. 
IV. COMPONENTS OF THE DATA MOBILITY MODEL 
AND DATA MOVING CASES 
Even with the Trusted-Oriented Data Protection 
Framework, the data is still exposed to potential violations 
when it is moved to new cloud hosts where there are no 
equivalence security measures to protect it. Data mobility is 
still a challenge for exchanging information among CSPs due 
the lack of approaches to ensure data protection and data 
auditing. Our earlier work only explored a simple mechanism 
for data-binding mechanism that allows the active data to alert 
its owner when it is moved to a new environment. 
Clearly, mobility management is one of the most important 
challenges in mobile IP [9]. When a mobile is roaming away 
from its home network, it registers its current location to its 
home agent on home network. Similarly, when a data unit 
moves from its original cloud, it needs to inform the original 
cloud its current locations and may also inform data owner its 
status.  The data itself, however, cannot execute these actions. 
In this paper, we leverage the ideas from mobile network about 
location register for a mobile by investigating a new LRD 
located at original cloud to serve for updating or retrieving data 
locations and a new recordable data structure enabling to 
record cloud host location in the data when there is any request 
data operations. Moving data to a new cloud environment, 
however, has to involve both the data and its supervisor. In our 
model we propose a scheme for establishing a clone supervisor 
for monitoring the moved data and data operations. At this 
stage, the verification procedure will be processed data 
requests only at the original cloud for access permissions since 
the deployment of protection framework may increase the 
complexity. Future development of the mobility management 
model may delegate the verification and access control to the 
visited cloud. With the deployment of the supervisor, data 
protection can be achieved despite the fact that data is located 
at visited cloud side. 
A. Parties and Components in a data mobility management 
model 
We define functions of parties involving in the mobility 
management model as follows. 
1) An old cloud can be an original cloud or a visited cloud 
offering cloud resources from clients. While an original cloud 
can offer cloud resources and verification procedure, a visited 
cloud is simply storing, providing data and forwarding 
verification requests for permission. A request from a new 
cloud or within an existing cloud for accessing cloud resources 
or to verify users’ permission will be submitted to the cloud 
interface. Since this request has to obtain an access right to use 
the data, the old cloud will define a common user interface for 
both kinds of request including parameters such as Source 
address, Destination address, Data_ID, Operation, TimeStamp. 
Then it will be forwarded to the CPRBAC service at the 
original cloud for verification. Only verified requests can be 
forwarded to the supervisor which will command the 
movement of its TDFS and invokes the mobility service for 
updating new data location. 
2) A new cloud creates a request to access cloud resources 
with appropriate parameters. The old cloud and the new cloud 
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 Request moving TDFS 
   Request to establish new supervisor 
   Inform message for establishing new supervisor 
  


















will have to agree in launching a clone supervisor at the new 
cloud to monitoring, protecting the moved data against any 
violation. In addition, the request has to specify its access 
purposes in order to meet obligations to the original cloud. As 
a result, the original cloud is able to process the request by 
approving resources or triggering protection services to lock 
requests and send an alarm to specific data owner or 
administrator. 
3) A supervisor is responsible for protecting its associated 
data, data locations and communication among clouds. It is 
created to monitor and detect data operations in cloud. To 
allow data mobility, a clone supervisor will be established at 
the new cloud based on agreements between the two clouds. 
Main functions of a supervisor include data verification and 
data location management. 
 Data verification: the supervisor monitors data 
operations either at the original cloud or the visited 
cloud. Data only accepts instructions from its 
supervisor. For monitoring function, the supervisor 
focuses mainly on detecting user’s operations at the 
operation system OS level such as move, copy and 
delete. When the supervisor detects such a request, it 
would activate the TDFS through instructions to 
execute the runtime environment analysis and inspect 
the validity of data operations. In our active data model, 
data operations will be verified at the shell which wraps 
the data in an executable status. 
 Data location management: the supervisor also reports 
timely data locations to the original cloud as well as 
updating the LRD since data itself cannot send location 
information to original cloud but it is able to record 
current location for tracing operations. It analyses 
networking location in order to obtain the current 
network address and send back to original cloud which 
is set as default source address in the report message. 
B. Establishing new supervisor procedure 
It is assumed that the new cloud and the original cloud 
agree to establish a new supervisor at the new site. Since the 
verification is processed at the original side, the new clone 
supervisor is for dealing with data moving cases among clouds. 
In the first case, data is moved from an original cloud to a new 
cloud (the request may be originated from the original cloud or 
from the new cloud). In the second case, data at an old cloud is 
moved to a new cloud and original cloud will process request 
verifications. In the third case, data at an old cloud is moved 
back to the original cloud; and in the last case, data at a cloud 
is moved to local storage (offline) with or without permissions.  
In the first case, when the original cloud receives a request 
to move data to the new cloud, it will verify and analyse the 
request to obtain the destination address. There are two 
possible scenarios: the request comes from the new cloud and 
the request comes from an entity in the home cloud such as the 
data owner or the administrator. In both scenarios, a general 
procedure has to be executed between the two clouds before 
moving the data. The procedure is as follows: 
 
Fig. 3. General establishing supervisor procedure 
1. After analysing the request, the original cloud sends a 
request to the new cloud for establishing a new supervisor at 
the new cloud. This effectively requests the visited cloud for 
the permission to install a new service.  At this time, the new 
cloud also verifies the request to evaluate wherever it can or 
cannot create the service. If there is the agreement between 
two clouds to create the new supervisor, a confirmed message 
will be sent from the new cloud to the home cloud. 
2.  Following the first step, information pertaining to the 
supervisor and the TDFS including the type of services, of the 
template of the supervisor, and the original location will be 
sent to the new cloud for creating a new instance of the 
supervisor. 
3. After the supervisor is created, the TDFS will be moved to 
new cloud. 
The new supervisor will be responsible for monitoring the 
TDFS at the new cloud as well as communicating with the 
original cloud since the new cloud does not provide the same 
data protection services.  
If the request originated from an entity in the home cloud, 
the destination address of the new cloud where data is to be 
moved to, has to be provided with the request. Once the 
destination address is identified, the home cloud can 
communicate with the new cloud. In both scenarios, security 
procedures are performed by the access control component, the 
CPRBAC, and the auditing component, the AAC together with 
the associated supervisor. Having satisfied with the conditions 
for moving the requested data, the home cloud sends a request 
in order to establish the clone supervisor at the new cloud. By 
doing this, the link between the supervisor and its data is still 
kept when data is stored at another location. Details of the 
procedure as follows. 
 
















1. The service request from the new cloud or from within the 
original cloud is sent to the original cloud. This request is 
authorized by the CPRBAC and the AAC. If it is a legal 
request, the supervisor is triggered to analyse data operations. 
Since it is a “move” request, the supervisor has to 
communicate with mobility component for establishing a clone 
supervisor at the new cloud. Illegal requests against predefined 
policies will be triggered by the active data protection unit 
(APDu) and captured by the AAC. Violation triggers in the 
AAC may also be triggered to assist the security administrator 
to execute some certain security prevention operations. 
2. The mobility component at the original cloud sends a request 
to the visited cloud for the permission to install a new service.  
The new cloud also verifies and evaluates the request to see if 
it can create the service. If an agreement is in place to create a 
new supervisor between two clouds, a confirmed message will 
be sent from the new cloud to the an original cloud. 
3. At this step, necessary information for creating the clone 
supervisor will be supplied to the new cloud. 
4. Once the new supervisor is created, the mobility component 
invokes instructions to move the data. The supervisor also 
queries the LRD to update the new data location. 
For the second case, the procedure is similar but the 
verification request needs to be forwarded from the old cloud 
to original cloud for authorization. The third case simply 
moves the data back to the original cloud and update the data 
location in the LRD. For the last case, the regular verification 
procedure is still executed at the original cloud to obtain the 
move permission.  
However, an exception will be raised when the original 
cloud detects a data move without a request or it cannot 
communicate with destination address provided in the request 
to establish supervisor. In these cases, the current supervisor 
has to report the current TDFS location to the original cloud 
for updating the LRD as well as triggering the data to update 
this address in its core component before moving. From this 
point, the TDFS has to record data access locations in its 
location list whenever users access the data even in the offline 
mode. 
V. MOBILITY MANAGEMENT MODEL 
In this paper we focus on providing a data mobility solution 
for cloud data moving among clouds while ensuring data 
protection and auditing relevant data locations and accessed 
data operations. The new features of our proposed model 
include: an active data framework with appropriate data 
structure and a Location Registration Database (LRD) to deal 
with mobility; protocols between clouds for data movement; 
procedures for establishing a clone supervisor at the visited 
cloud for data protection purposes. In particular, there will be a 
mobility service agent  responsible for updating and retrieving 
data location from the LRD. Figure 5 depicts the model and its 
four core components: 1) the data core protection component, 
2) the mobility management component, 3) the trusted security 
management component, and 4) the cloud interface. 
 
Fig. 5. The design of data mobility model 
1) The data core protection component: this component is 
designed to enable active surveillance, smart analysis, self-
protection, and self-defense capabilities directly on to the data 
itself. The data is transformed and encapsulated in TDFS that 
supports confidentiality, integrity, and intrusion-tolerance [8]. 
To support mobility, a special encrypted element namely 
Recordable Mobility Data (RMD) is designed to record user’s 
operations when they access the data. Only the data owner who 
has the decryption key can trace previous data operations. The 
management and coordination of cloud data for each tenant is 
processed by the supervisor, whose active service instance is 
activated when the corresponding tenant subscribes to a cloud 
storage service. Several supervisor service instances can be 
deployed to deal with a large number of requests from diverse 
virtual servers or machines (VMs). An atomic APDu contains 
an active data cube (the TDFS) and its supervisor.   
2) The mobility management component: this component 
includes the Mobility Service (MS) and the LRD. It aims to 
store and manage information about the supervisor and the 
TDFS at original cloud. The component centres around the 
location registration procedure when TDFS is moved by 
maintaining connections with external supervisors.  
The MS is responsible for creating queries to the LRD. 
When the data is created at a cloud, the supervisor invokes the 
MS to update the information about the TDFS in the LRD. In 
addition, MS also supports the establishment of the new 
supervisor at the visited cloud. 
The LRD stores the TDFS information related to data 
location, data operations, and data owner for data status 
monitoring purposes. When a TDFS is subscribed to a cloud, it 
needs to register and is allocated a supervisor that is 
responsible for the data welfare including monitoring and 
raising an alarm if illegal data operations are detected. 
Therefore, whenever a TDFS moves out of its home cloud, the 
supervisor will invoke a query to extract information from the 
database necessary for the establishment of the clone 
supervisor at the new cloud. 
3) The trusted security management component: this 
component is proposed to execute trusted security 
management. The CPRBAC service [10] is proposed to define 
and describe the security boundary on data operations in 
distributed clouds. Access resource requests that are not 
specified in the policy database will be rejected. The fine-
grained policy structure of the CPRBAC allows users to 
  
 
configure and define specific and secure protection 
requirements on their data. Authentication and authorization 
will be offered by the service. The AAC [11] is introduced to 
execute and audit users’ requests in a secure and consistent 
manner. Users’ request must be actively audited under a 
distributed transaction management session. Through 
recording audit data created as the attestations, the CSPs can 
report the evidences of data violations to their users. The users 
are more inclined to adopt the cloud solution for their 
businesses as they can establish more acceptable SLA with 
their subscribed CSPs in a firmed trustworthy relationship. 
The auditability can be achieved by the AAC. 
4) Cloud interface: Cloud access interfaces provide data 
service interfaces to access active data in cloud storage 
systems. It forwards requests with parameters to security 
management component to verify access permission. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Data structure design 
Data is structured utilizing Active Data-Centric 
framework [8]. A special structure namely Recordable 
Mobility Data (RMD) is designed to record information 
associated with users’ access request. The information 
includes Subject_ID, Data_ID, Operation, TimeStamp, and 
Cloud location. This information is transparent to its data 
owner. In other words, it is hidden from users’ data operation. 
The stored information is encrypted using the RSA encryption 
to avoid possible information leakage. Only the data owner 
has the corresponding key to disclose them for tracing 
previous operations.  














Fig. 7. Recordable mobility data structure 
B. Data mobility management workflows 
When a customer subscribes to the cloud service, the CSP 
will assign roles associated with the data for users, allowing 
them to access a virtual user directory and workspace for the 
tenant, and an initial set of empty active data cubes will be 
created according to the regular data types. After assigning 
roles, the supervisor will be invoked to send a request to the 
mobility service for data location registration. The request 
containing parameter such as UserID, DataID, Location and 
TimeStamp will be executed as a query to update to the 
database. Finally, the user will receive a data location 
registration acknowledgement message via the mobility 
service. Figure 8 presents the workflow for a new data 
location registration. 
Fig. 8. New data location registration workflow 
When a user needs to execute data operations such as read, 
insert, write and move the data, he/she will send a request to 
the cloud interface including a set of parameters such as 
UserID, DataId, Operation and Location and TimeStamp. In 
turn, a verification process is created to perform a sequence of 
steps. Firstly, it invokes the supervisor to access the data. 
Hence, the supervisor needs to establish the validity of the 
request by forward it to the original cloud where data location 
is also updated. If the request is not valid or allowed by the 
access policy, the supervisor will raise an alarm to notify the 
system administrator or related legislation organization. In 
fact, if desired, the data owner may be informed immediately 
when the original cloud detects the violation through the 
mobility service. If the request is permitted, the mobility 
service will update data location before approved verification 
is sent to the supervisor. From this point, data operations will 
be performed on the TDFS but each operation is recorded 
inside the TDFS for tracing purposes. Figure 9 presents the 
general procedure for data mobility workflow  
 
Fig. 9. Data mobility workflow 
When the mobility service is triggered, it creates a request 
and sends it to the data operator where data location is queried 
at the LRD. Further, the data owner (if elected) will also be 
informed a message concerning the accessed operations via 
email or mobile devices. Details of the workflow are shown in 
figure 10.  
  
 
Fig. 10. Mobility service workflow 
VII. EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
A. Experimentation setup 
Our experimental environment has been set up as follows: 
Amazon EC2 [12] was used as the original cloud to provide 
cloud resources and verify requests. We created an instance of 
Windows 2012 server running on Intel Xeron E5-2670 v2 
2.5GHz 2.5GHz 1GB. Packages of the model were deployed 
on this instance and requests were accessed via RMI interface. 
We also created another instance at Amazon EC2 running 
MySQL to store the LRD with 5 GB. Azure cloud [13] was 
used as the visited cloud. We created a virtual machine running 
Windows 2012 server 1.75GB AMD Opteron Processor 4171 
HE 2.1 GHz to send requests via RMI interface. In order to 
demonstrate the working of the mobility model, a message 
application for notification at users’ mobile phone was 
implemented in Java on an Android 4.4 smartphone with 3GB 
RAM and a 2400 MHz CPU. Google Cloud Message (GCM) 
[14] was devised to send messages informing users when the 
data was accessed or moved at cloud side. A notification could 
be triggered via two sources depending on the request of data 
operations. If the request was to move or to copy data, the 
mobility service would inform the data owner via GCM while 
operations such as read or write would be triggered by the 
probe inside the data. 
The current experiments were based on following 
assumptions as they mainly focus on the mobility model: we 
assumed that the runtime environment (JVM) of the active data 
behaved correctly at participant clouds, and we assumed that 
the data would be activated when it moves to a new cloud host. 
We also assumed that a safe Location Service Provider (LSP) 
was available on the Internet and CSPs had the agreement to 
establish new supervisor. At this stage, we only tested our 
model on cases where TDFS and regular files were moved 
between two clouds. 
B. Evaluation 
Since this work investigates a new data mobility model for 
ADCu, We first examined the time spent in the verification and 
identification and then measured the performance of our 
model. Components of the model were verified its functions 
which response accurately to a data moving requests such as 
verifying permissions, triggering an alter message, updating 
data location and informing user about data location. 
Furthermore, the experiments demonstrated the performance 
comparison between the operation on regular data files and 
ADCu in our model to prove that there was not too much the 
additional overhead when deploying the model within ADCu. 
The idea is to determine the overhead introduced by the 
security features and mobility service. We considered 
increasing the file size from 300KB to 1000KB for both TDFS 
and normal files (PDF files). The result of a request to move 
the data is shown in Table I. The executed time tRequest for each 
request is composed of three determinants: the verification 
time tLookup service, the location register time tVerification and mobility 
and the data operation time tData operation 
tRequest  = tLookup service + tVerification and mobility + tData operation 
1) tLookup service : is the time that client spent looking up server’s 
RMI interface and sends the request. 
2) tVerification and mobility: is security and mobility service latency. 
The CPRBAC and Location register will be processed during 
this period. 
3) tData operation: is the data transfer time between the original 
cloud and the visited cloud. 
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300 1467.4 595.2 1735.6 3798.2 1448.4 579.6 1708 3736 
400 1486 589 1985.8 4060.8 1445.2 576 2006.2 4027.4 
500 1452.2 601.6 2117.6 4171.4 1458.4 598 2074.8 4131.2 
600 1452.8 579.8 2303 4335.6 1435.8 583.4 2243 4262.2 
700 1470.8 579 2449.4 4499.2 1449.4 585.8 2475 4510.2 
800 1458.4 595.8 2555.6 4609.8 1451.8 595.2 2546 4593 
900 1435.8 582.6 2647.2 4665.6 1454.2 609.2 2727.2 4790.6 
1000 1465 593.6 2781 4839.6 1450 587.8 2820 4857.8 
Fig. 11. Modules Processing Duration 
From the results, it is clear that the processing time for 
TDFS is slightly more than that for normal files (4372.53ms in 
comparison with 4363.55ms of the later). The significant time 
contributes to the whole process are Lookup service time and 
moving data time since we deployed instances located at 
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main process of the model, however, only constitutes small 
amount of time (589.58 of 4372.53ms for TDFS and 589.38 of 
4363.55ms for Normal file respectively). The comparative 
result is also illustrated graphically in figure 11 and figure 12. 
First, we identified the sources of delay such as verification 
time, the data transfer time and lookup service times. The 
experimental values on the verification time and lookup service 
of the model are approximately same for TDFS and normal 
file. Therefore, the source of delay could be introduced by the 
transfer time. So, we run the same request with different data 
sizes. 








Fig. 13. Data notification view in SonyXperia Z2 
The results show that the transfer data time is the 
significant source of latency. This means the data protection 
and mobility service are not the reasons for the introduced 
communication overhead. Even when the data size was 
increased from 300 KB to 1000 KB the verification overhead 
did not increase significantly. 
Figure 13 shows alerting the messages to data owner via 
the mobile phone when there are requests to move the TDFS 
and regular file. It is demonstrated that the supervisor can 
detect invoke mobility service to send the alter message to 
user’s mobile device immediately when there is a request to 
move the data at both original cloud and visited cloud. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented a data mobility management model 
for data mobility and data protection to enhance the exchange 
information among CSPs while ensuring users’ controllability, 
traceability of data and authorized access to cloud resources 
under a fine-grained data protection scheme. It also proposed a 
novel LRD that is capable to serve for tracing and tracking data 
locations. Furthermore, a new TDFS structure with recordable 
structure was designed to actively capture locations of requests. 
More importantly, a proposed establishing supervisor at visited 
cloud is able to deploy the equivalence data protection scheme 
at both cloud side to achieve an intrusion tolerant scheme. The 
experimental outcomes demonstrate feasibility, efficiency of 
the model. Further, the reliability of the system is guaranteed in 
terms of processing time. 
The future work will consider the deployment of more 
clouds for the data mobility model. In addition, different data 
operations, data moving cases and more requests will be 
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